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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to provide some perspectives on the 
U.S. housing and credit crisis. It briefly examines the genesis of 
the crisis in the housing markets, where real home prices departed 
signiﬁcantly from economic fundamentals. The focus is also made 
on the rapid expansion of credit default swaps in a regulatory 
vacuum that was bound to generate uncontrolled exposures and 
unmitigated systemic risk. The short-term solutions to the ﬁnancial 
crisis have been characterized by extensive relief programs, looser 
monetary policies and substantial fiscal stimulus, which have 
their own limits and long-term costs. Such remedies imply that 
the recovery of financial institutions may be achieved only at the 
expense of a severe deterioration in the balance sheets of central 
banks and unprecedented government deﬁcits. It is thus important 
to reﬂect upon alternative remedies such as debt for equity swaps 
which are more consistent with market discipline and responsible 
investment.
Ⅰ．Introduction
It is difﬁcult to provide a full account of the causes of the U.S. housing and credit 
crisis and understand its long-term implications as it rapidly evolves. But, it may 
be useful to shed light on the underlying conditions and important events that 
contributed to its precipitation. The bubble in the housing and capital markets 
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conferred a false sense of conﬁdence, and everlasting prosperity. But the trend 
for increasing asset prices was by no means sustainable and the transition proc-
ess from wealth creation to wealth destruction with the collapse of credit markets 
has been rather precipitous. The steep fall in housing and equity prices is a re-
minder that while bubbles may develop over either limited or longer periods of 
time, they can hardly be terminated on gradual basis. In the words of Galbraith 
（1954）, to incise a bubble with a needle in order for it to subside gradually is a 
task of no small delicacy.
The question of whether this ﬁnancial crisis was to a large extent predict-
able and hardly surprising is a matter of debate. It may be argued that the onset 
of the crisis can possibly be described with reference to the Minsky credit cycle 
model, where the ﬁnancial system can play a signiﬁcant role in exaggerating the 
business cycle. Lower borrowing costs may be conducive to substantial amounts 
of credit devoted to speculative activities. At some point in the business cycle, 
higher leverage can lead to serious debt problems for investors and market li-
quidity problems. The inability of Ponzi borrowers to service neither interest nor 
principal payments can be considered as an important turning point in the credit 
cycle. Thus, asset bubbles generated by such credit cycles are typically charac-
terized by excessive borrowing for speculative activities, which can be fuelled for 
instance by the loosening of credit standards and lack of adequate ﬁnancial regu-
lation.
From this perspective, important questions naturally arise as to what ex-
tent monetary policy, ﬁnancial regulation, and securitization contributed to the 
U.S. ﬁnancial crisis. There are crucial issues that need further examination in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the U.S. credit market, such as whether the systemic 
risk associated with ﬁnancial institutions can be properly assessed and appropri-
ately mitigated by ﬁnancial regulators, and whether the rescue of certain ﬁnan-
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cial institutions is warranted on economic grounds. The management of the crisis 
poses indeed some critical problems, which relate to the present architecture 
of the ﬁnancial system, including the function of rating agencies, and the role of 
regulatory authorities. The objective of the present study is to provide some re-
ﬂections on the U.S. housing and credit crisis from the economic and regulatory 
perspectives. The focus is made ﬁrst on asset pricing and the genesis of housing 
crisis due to signiﬁcant departures of home prices from economic fundamentals. 
The advent of ﬁnancial securitization and the growth of credit default swaps are 
then brieﬂy considered from the regulatory perspective. Finally, the contents and 
impact of government responses to the credit crisis are examined, mainly with 
respect to the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Supervisory Capital As-
sessment Program.
Ⅱ．Historical perspective on the behavior 
of U.S. housing prices
In order to better understand the genesis of the housing crisis and the develop-
ments that precipitated the fall in asset prices, it is important to provide a histori-
cal perspective using the time-series of U.S. home prices. Figure 1 describes 
the behavior of U.S. real home prices, real building costs and real interest rates 
as well as the U.S. population over the period from 1890 to 2006. The long-term 
average of real home prices is about 102 （with home prices in 1890 set to 100）, 
but the peak of 200 reached in 2006 amounts to almost double the long-term 
mean. This increase did not take place on a monotonous basis over the years, but 
it seems to occur over a short period starting from the mid 1990s. Indeed, the 
average real house prices until 1950 was only around 88, but it rose to 112 over 
the subsequent period until 1990. Judging from this statistical evidence, the 85％ 
increase in real home prices over the ten-year period from 1997 to 2006 is unprec-
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edented.
As noted by Shiller （2008）, this sharp jump in real home prices can hardly 
be justiﬁed on the basis of population dynamics or changes in building costs and 
interest rates. The U.S. population seems to rise monotonously and the increas-
ing pattern may lend support to a rise in the aggregate demand for homes. But 
the observed dynamics can hardly explain the sharp increase in home prices. It 
should be noted that in addition to demand shocks, the behavior of home prices 
may be also reflective of supply shocks. The evidence from Figure 1 suggests 
that as far as the supply factors are concerned, the average real building costs 
rose to 79 over the last decade until 2006, which is above the long-term mean of 
63 from 1890 to 2006. But it is also clear that real building costs were already on 
the descending curve at the time when real home prices were rising. It is thus 
difﬁcult to attribute the sharp rise in home prices to higher building costs. This 
can hardly be understood in light of changes in real interest rates either, which 
Figure 1. Time-series behavior of U.S. home prices
（Sample period: 1890-2006）
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leaves the observed rise in real home prices difficult to explain on theoretical 
basis. The misalignment of home prices with economic fundamentals provides 
sufficient evidence of mispricing, which could only beget market corrections, 
however delayed such adjustments may be. Given this clear evidence of unsus-
tainable home prices, there is little substance in the argument that a fall in home 
prices was highly unlikely.
The view that subprime mortgages are responsible for the severe prob-
lems in the entire housing market cannot be defended either. As shown by Shiller
（2008）, despite differences in the behavior of home prices across price tiers, the 
housing bubble was observed with respect to lower-priced, mid-priced and high-
priced houses invariably. In this sense, the pricing failures of the housing market 
are not confined to the subprime tier, and the current financial crisis should 
be fully understood in light of its pervasiveness across different price tiers and 
across cities. In this sense, the crisis in the housing market is a natural outcome 
of the irrational divorce of real home prices from the economic and demographic 
fundamentals.
History may not provide an accurate estimate of how much lower resi-
dential investments may decrease in the aftermath of crises. The sharp and 
prolonged decreases in home prices over the period 2007-08 provides clear signs 
that the momentum for higher inventories and shrinking construction is gath-
ering. Judging from the three previous housing cycles of 1975, 1982 and 1991, 
residential investment tends to peak at 5.5％ of GDP and fall to levels  as low as 
3.5％ of GDP. While the current crisis does not differ from earlier episodes with 
respect to its peak levels reached in 2006, investment is already as low as 3.1％ 
of GDP as suggested by estimates from the second quarter 2008. This provides 
further signs of prolonged downward spirals in the housing market and the pros-
pects for prompt recovery are rather remote.
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Ⅲ．Financial crisis and financial market volatility
According to the 2008 annual report by the Bank for International Settlements, 
the initial crisis in the subprime residential mortgage-backed securities（RMBS）
in June-July 2007 had the effect of raising the level of volatility in credit markets 
including collateralized debt obligations（CDO）, and commercial mortgages. The 
spillover into short-term credit and interbank money markets ensued as the crisis 
evolved into one of squeezed liquidity and asset deﬂation. There were also early 
indications of liquidity problems in the market for asset-backed commercial pa-
pers. Further uncertainty about asset valuation is associated with waves of down-
grades in RMBS and CDO ratings and revisions of earlier writedown announce-
ments. Given the increased demand for liquidity to mitigate losses, there were 
considerable strains in the ﬁnancial system, which were reﬂected by widening 
credit spreads. By March 2008, the evidence of dysfunctional ﬁnancial markets 
was mounting due to increased liquidity demand and concerns about systemic 
risk and the stability of the ﬁnancial system.
Upon the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, the issuance of asset-backed secu-
rities in the fourth quarter of 2008 decreased to $2.7 billion, which represents 
a fall of 86.7 percent from the previous quarter, with virtually no asset-backed 
securities  issued with respect to the main categories of home equity, student 
loans, credit cards, and equipment leases. Indeed, according to research by the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the market for credit card 
and student loans recorded no single issuance in the fourth quarter 2008. Also, 
the home equity ABS issuance decreased more than 98 percent in 2008 relative 
to comparable statistics for 2007. Part of the reason for the signiﬁcant increase in 
defaults and foreclosures in the subprime sector starting from 2005 is that a large 
portion of loans were hybrid Adjustable Rate Mortgages（ARMs）. There is a 
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high potential for systemic reﬁnancing and default associated with ARMs, which 
are usually offered at high spreads and designed essentially to be reﬁnanced or 
defaulted upon within a couple of years. An important number of ARMs were 
expected to be the subject of interest rate resets in 2008. The exposures to losses 
from defaults in the subprime sector were reduced through the securitization 
process, but the realization of signiﬁcant losses is also sensitive to the scale and 
magnitude of rating downgrades. 
Indeed, according to S&P Global Fixed Income Research, there were as 
many as 55 issuer downgrades from investment grade to speculative grade in 
2008. The default of the investment bank Lehman Brothers alone represents ap-
proximately a third of the debt worth affected by these downgrades. The number 
of issuers subject to such downgrades was highest in the homebuilders and real 
estate sector, followed by the banking and insurance industry, among others. 
Part of the reason for the rapid spillover of housing problems into the ﬁnancial 
sector was the growing fear of forced sales of assets held by Structured Invest-
ment Vehicles. The mounting selling pressures in mortgage markets are in fact 
responsive to rating changes, and collateralized debt obligations are also sensi-
tive to changes in credit quality. Lower ratings have the direct effect of changing 
default projections and affect the plausibility of underlying assumptions such as 
default severity, which measures the amount of loss incurred in case of default. 
The increasing potential for defaults and further deterioration in the credit mar-
ket is conducive  to widespread deleveraging and substantial reduction in risk 
appetite.
In light of the increased systemic risk and heightened uncertainty, the 
onset of the housing and credit crisis exerted also downward pressures on equity 
prices. The S&P 500 composite index exhibited in Figure 2, clearly indicates a 
signiﬁcant downward trend starting from June-July 2007. This equity benchmark 
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succumbed to strains in the ﬁnancial system and growing fears about the stability 
of the banking sector in particular. It decreased from the peak of 1565 in October 
2007 to 676 in March 2009. The investors’ perceptions of higher volatility are 
reflected by the behavior of the new VIX implied volatility index disseminated 
by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. This benchmark of volatility expecta-
tions is derived from the S&P500 options and provides a gauge of investors fear 
and changing attitudes toward risk. The time-series of the VIX levels described 
in Figure 2 indicates that market volatility was expected to increase signiﬁcantly 
in March 2007 and rise to even higher levels in August 2007. These volatility ex-
pectations ﬂuctuated erratically until September 2008 and signiﬁcantly increased 
afterward to unprecedented levels.
These sharp increases in volatility expectations are closely related to ma-
jor events such as the demise of Bear Stearns in March 2008. The failure of this 
investment bank to rollover repo funds under the weight of huge amounts of il-
Figure 2. Time-series of S&P500 composite and VIX implied volatility index
（Sample period: January 2007-April 2009）
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liquid mortgage assets resulted in its takeover by J.P.Morgan. The sudden rise in 
anticipated volatility seems to be triggered also by the demise in September 2008 
of Lehman Brothers, another investment bank with substantially high leveraged 
positions. The level of the VIX volatility benchmark is inversely related to the un-
derlying S&P500 composite index. The expected rise in volatility coincides with 
the arrival of new information about the ﬁnancial turmoil in the credit markets. 
The average VIX level over the last quarter 2008 reached 58, which is much high-
er than the long-term mean of 20 estimated from the sample period 1990-2008. 
The S&P500 declined by 19％ in the fourth quarter 2008 as the VIX index re-
mained at levels in excess of 40, more than double the long-term mean. The new 
VIX index reached the historical closing level of 80.86 on October 27, 2008 in as-
sociation with sharp decreases in equity markets around the world. Though this 
volatility index receded to lower levels over more recent periods, its average from 
January to April 2009 is still higher than the long-term mean. There are no signs 
of mean reversion judging from the degree of investors’ fear as measured by this 
volatility index, which has not abated yet to pre-crisis levels. 
Ⅳ．Regulatory perspectives on the credit crisis
Given the unprecedented levels of volatility in equity markets and the dysfunc-
tional credit markets, intervention from monetary authorities through expansion-
ary monetary policy and the recourse to public ﬁnances constitute an important 
part of the immediate remedies to the crisis. By providing liquidity to ﬁnancial 
institutions, the Federal Reserve became the de facto lender of ﬁrst and last re-
sort. There are however varying opinions as to the economic rationale behind 
the selective rescues of ﬁnancial institutions, the appropriate deﬁnition of the too-
big-to-fail maxim, and the long-term effects of public funds injections. Arguably, 
the signiﬁcant problems posed by the onset of the housing and ﬁnancial crisis 
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have exposed serious ﬂaws in the ﬁnancial architecture, the design of ﬁnancial 
products, and the regulation of financial markets. Because these are not mere 
signs of weakness and fatigue but strong indicators of structural ﬂaws, there is a 
need to assess the regulatory treatment of new ﬁnancial practices such as the se-
curitization process and CDS trading as well as the more traditional credit-rating 
process.
Part of the blame for the housing crisis is laid at the door of the securiti-
zation process, which involves the bundling of cash ﬂows from various sources 
such as consumer loans and home mortgages into ﬁnancial claims or packages 
of securities. These hybrid securities are backed by the pool of cash ﬂows, which 
are distributed among investors according to predetermined priority rules. The 
role of securitization may be appreciated in relation to its attraction of additional 
funds for housing investment, providing thereby an additional source of liquidity. 
It can also be regarded as providing value to the society in terms of new channels 
for risk diversiﬁcation. The question remains however as to what extent securiti-
zation has in the absence of adequate regulation, contributed to the serious prob-
lems in the credit markets.
Similar regulatory issues arise with respect to the advent of credit default 
swaps. Under this synthetic securitization scheme, there is transfer of credit risk 
to investors but without transfer of the pool of underlying assets themselves from 
the owner’s balance sheet. It is possible for the owner of the assets to hedge 
against credit default by purchasing credit default swaps. In case of default, the 
CDS buyer is compensated by the protection seller for the same losses suffered 
on the underlying assets. The trading of CDS takes place entirely over-the-coun-
ter and usually involves banks or groups of banks. It should be however noted 
that the protection buyer is under no obligation to provide evidence of loss in or-
der to obtain compensation. This implies that claims by CDS buyers for compen-
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sation in association with the credit event are not conditional on the ownership of 
the reference assets. It is this feature that opens avenues for criticism that CDS 
is not only used for risk-hedging purposes but also for speculative trading, which 
allows for the build-up of counterparty risk and uncontrolled systemic risk.
The CDS spread indicates the annual amount that the protection buyer 
is required to pay in order to be entitled to compensation in association with the 
credit event, which can be deﬁned in terms of default, bankruptcy or even credit 
rating downgrades. This spread is expressed in basis points, as a percentage of 
the notional amount of debt and in relation to the credit risk exposure of the pro-
tection buyer. An increase in CDS spreads is indicative of higher risk of default as 
perceived by market participants, or more precisely an increase in the probability 
of the credit event. The downgrade of General Motors debt in April 2005 translat-
ed into a signiﬁcant increase in CDS spreads of several basis points. A substantial 
rise in GM idiosyncratic risk is reﬂected by a widening of CDS spreads and offers 
an opportunity for market participants such as the American International Group 
and hedge funds to sell protection. However, writing a CDS protection involves 
both a default risk and spread risk. Indeed, huge losses may be incurred in the 
case of GM default and the protection seller is also exposed to losses on mark-
to-market basis in case the spread widens signiﬁcantly. Judging from Figure 3, 
there are clear signs of market perceptions of increased risks attached with GM 
debt in early 2008 and these were exacerbated by the onset of the credit crisis in 
September of the same year. The CDS spreads jumped to 20,000 bps and further 
to 70,000 bps implying double-digit probabilities of default. The widening of CDS 
spreads attaining historical levels in May 2009 reﬂected the increasing anticipa-
tions of GM ﬁling for bankruptcy.
It is clear from Figure 3 that the CDS spreads were also widening at the 
same time for AIG, which played a major role in CDS markets as protection 
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seller. The widening CDS spread on GM debt provided not so much an oppor-
tunity for additional protection writers as a warning of build-up of default risk. 
The irony is that the single institution that provided protection against default by 
several reference entities posed itself a major risk of default. The high exposure 
of AIG to substantial compensation payments in case of default by reference enti-
ties, including presumably downgrades or default over GM debt, constituted a 
signiﬁcant source of systemic risk. Arguably, it is on account of the sheer scale of 
this systemic risk that the initial rescue of AIG in September 2008 by the Federal 
Reserve was made. However, it effectively extended the domain of too-big-to-fail 
institutions to non-banking companies and increased thereby the extent of moral 
hazard inherent in such rescues. The government stands as a de facto protection 
seller, though with no prior contractual agreement made and no CDS premium 
received. The public funds injected into AIG can be regarded as compensation 
payments, triggered by a default event deﬁned not so much with respect to other 
reference entities as with protection sellers themselves. The rescue by the Fed-
eral Reserve of an insurance company that is deemed too big to fail leaves the 
Figure 3. Credit default swaps on General Motors and American International Group 
（Sample period: January 2004-May 2009）
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regulatory authorities confronted with important issues, including the extent of 
exposure to future compensation payments and the importance of systemic risk.
Market perceptions of the creditworthiness of companies such as GM 
and AIG reflected in the CDS spreads are not necessarily consistent with firm 
valuations and assessments by rating agencies. As far as the GM idiosyncratic 
risks are concerned, there were increasing signs of distress since 2000, based 
on its deteriorating proﬁtability, working capital, leverage levels and debt service 
management. But judging from Figure 3, it is only in 2005 that the CDS market 
provided initial signs of ﬁnancial distress following S&P and Moody’s downgrade 
of GM debt to sub-investment grade. The belated changes in rating grades are at 
the heart of the increasing loss of faith in the ratings agencies. It is thus crucial 
to address the inherent conﬂicts of interest in the ratings industry. To the extent 
that rating agencies routinely advise issuers on how to achieve investment grade, 
there is room for serious concerns about their independent judgment.
As with the ratings industry, the rapid growth of the CDS market should 
not obscure its own shortcomings. In the absence of adequate regulation, CDS 
trading has the potential of engendering signiﬁcant problems in the credit mar-
kets. Though parties to CDS negotiations and trading are represented by so-
phisticated parties, which exclude individual investors, it is difﬁcult to argue that 
adequate  regulation is best left to market participants to decide upon. Indeed, in 
order to mitigate systemic risk, it is crucial to properly account for the individual 
obligations of counterparties including banks and brokers. It is admittedly dif-
ﬁcult however to manage counterparty risk in the absence of a central clearing 
house for CDS transactions. Furthermore, under the current state of affairs, 
CDS trades are excluded from regulation by the CFTC Section 2（g）of the Com-
modities Exchange Act. They are also excluded from regulation by the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission following Section 2068 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
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Act. There is thus uncertainty about the statutory authority for the regulation of 
credit default swaps. This CDS regulatory environment, or lack thereof, does not 
allow for timely measurement and informed assessment of the build-up of risk in 
the ﬁnancial system.
Ⅴ．Regulatory supervision
The demise of some investment banks and the ﬁnancial difﬁculties faced by in-
surance companies such as AIG should not be deemed as isolated failures. Thus, 
the important question remains as to whether there is sufﬁcient authority in the 
present regulatory system to deal with systemic risk. Arguably, systemic risk 
regulation lies with the Federal Reserve. But the pressing issue is that there is a 
lack of authority within the federal system itself to force banking institutions into 
bankruptcy. The crisis lends further support to the argument that the authority 
of the Federal Reserve System should be extended to reign in excessive lever-
age. Indeed, allowing institutions to fail, irrespective of their size, leverage, risk 
exposure, and market conditions, may affect the functioning of ﬁnancial system 
in the short term and lead to substantial social costs. But allowing for the failure 
of imprudent institutions with high leverage and limited reserves may be the 
best regulatory option. No system can be devised to prevent all failures but the 
objective is to reduce the likelihood of defaults due to excessive leverage and in-
adequate risk management.
The reaction of the U.S. monetary authorities to the ﬁnancial crisis took 
several aspects ranging from the Troubled Asset Relief Program to successive 
interest rate cuts. Starting from September 2007, the Fed Funds target rate was 
reduced from 5.25％ to 0.25％ in order to provide additional liquidity to credit 
markets. In order to circumvent restrictions on ﬁnancial rescue schemes, invest-
ment banks were transformed into bank-holding corporations. While the eco-
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nomic rationale behind the redeﬁnition of the notion of too-big-to-fail institutions 
remains unclear, there was seemingly some reluctance from investment banks to 
endorse the new status that subjects them to increased regulatory supervision. 
Indeed, unlike commercial banks, investment banks and hedge funds face less 
scrutiny and regulation from the Securities and Exchange Commission, and tend 
to increase their leverage during booms and decrease it during crises. In fact, the 
new status has rather brought about some immediate beneﬁts in the sense that 
new bank-holding companies are only required to report results starting from 
the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The signiﬁcant net proﬁts announced by Goldman Sachs 
for instance can be partly explained by the required switch to calendar-year re-
porting. This actually resulted in suppressing the mediocre performance during 
December 2008, in association  with the credit turmoil.
This extension of regulatory supervision by the Federal Reserve is supple-
mented by the implementation of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
（SCAP） in February 2009. Aimed at reducing the level of uncertainly about the 
financial sysytem and restoring confidence in the financial institutions, these 
stress tests were undertaken to assess the readiness of the 19 largest bank-hold-
ing companies （BHC） to withstand severe economic downturns. In a white paper 
issued on April 24, 2009, the Fed reviewed the SCAP design and implementation. 
This program assesses the level of resources available to BHCs and their ability 
to absorb losses under adverse economic conditions. The important question is 
whether some additional capital buffer is required to maintain the ability of such 
BHCs to meet their customers’credit needs and fully exercise their role of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries should the economic environment worsens. The stress tests 
are thus meant to assess revenues and losses under two worse-case macroeco-
nomic scenarios over the two-year period 2009-10. Some BHCs may be required 
to increase their capital base or improve capital quality based on the results of 
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this forward-looking exercise.
The SCAP considers two alternative macroeconomic scenarios, including 
a baseline course of events and a set of more adverse conditions. The economic 
outlooks draw upon projections based on consensus forecasts and the Case-
Shiller 10-city composite index futures. The assumptions underlying the baseline 
scenario include a fall in house prices of 14 percent and real GDP growth of 
-2.0％ in 2009 and a rate of unemployment of 8.8 percent for 2010. The worst-case 
assumptions for the U.S. economy consider an economic contraction of 3.3 per-
cent for 2009, a decrease of 22 percent in housing prices, and an unemployment 
rate of 10.3 percent for 2010. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying the 
worst-case scenario is a matter of debate, but while the prospects for a deeper 
and longer economic recession may be deemed to be unlikely, the rate of unem-
ployment continues to rise, reaching 9.4 percent in May 2009. The job losses in 
manufacturing industries are signiﬁcant, and the ﬁling for bankruptcy protection 
by GM may only add to the momentum for rising unemployment. The annualized 
quarterly rate of GDP growth for the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 reached -5.7 percent. 
These economic indicators are pointing toward a worsening of economic condi-
tions, possibly beyond the worst-case scenario as far as unemployment rates are 
concerned.
The SCAP stress test results announced in May 2009 suggest that nine of 
the nineteen BHCs are not required to augment their capital reserves in order to 
provide additional cushion against adverse economic conditions. However, sever-
al concerns can be raised with respect to the design and implementation of these 
stress tests. While the results of this supervisory exercise may help attenuating 
investors’fears and anxiety about the banking sector, the important question re-
mains as to what may happen if the economic recession veers ultimately toward 
depression. Though the adverse alternative is not intended to be a “worst-case”
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scenario, the U.S. economy is deteriorating signiﬁcantly and there is mounting 
evidence of deﬂationary pressures building up. The assumptions underlying the 
more adverse scenario, particularly the unemployment rate, may not be sufﬁcient 
to capture the higher degree of adversity of future economic conditions.
Furthermore, the stress tests are primarily based on evaluations provided 
by the ﬁnancial institutions themselves. They are not founded on independent ap-
praisals by the regulatory authorities or by external auditors. It is in this respect 
that some economists such as Paul Krugman questioned the comprehensiveness 
of the assessment exercise and the reliability of the ﬁnal results in the absence of 
genuine audit. In light of the serious concerns raised in regard to the underlying 
methodology and simulation results, the shift of foci toward uncertainty about the 
U.S. ﬁscal conditions is understandable. The growing concerns are not limited to 
the ability of ﬁnancial institutions to repay TARP funds, but extend to the sustain-
ability of government indebtedness. Given the price deﬂation in corporate bond 
and equity markets, investors can traditionally take refuge in the safety of gov-
ernment bonds. But the yield on government bonds is also rising together with 
concerns about the soundness of ﬁscal policies and the prospects of debt trap.
Conclusions
The methodology underlying the SCAP simulation tests is as important as the 
reported results, and the crucial question remains as to whether these stress 
tests can be replicated. Indeed, as noted by the Congressional Oversight Panel, it 
is difﬁcult to reassess the capital needs of each institution under different param-
eter estimates and changing assumptions. In the absence of further details about 
stress tests, it is not possible to review neither the quality of reported projections 
nor the accuracy of calculations. The dependence of the supervisory authorities 
on the banks’own data and projections may be misplaced. It was indeed the fail-
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ure by these very institutions to account for their risk exposures that led to the 
credit crisis in the ﬁrst place. It may be possible to portray imprudent investment 
banks and insurance companies as the victims of once-in-a-lifetime shocks, but 
that oversimpliﬁcation of the problem can only help perpetuating it.
While it is difﬁcult to split the blame among market participants, ﬁnancial 
regulators, ﬁnancial institutions, and rating agencies, it is also important to avoid 
attributing the crisis merely to a combination of cyclical economic downturns 
and market failures. Clearly, policy failures together with insufficient market 
discipline and inadequate regulation helped exacerbating the crisis. The rapid 
growth of CDS trading in a regulatory vacuum and in the absence of a clearing 
house was also bound to generate uncontrolled systemic risk. Furthermore, the 
expansionary monetary policy contributed to the making of the asset bubble and 
overindulgence in debt. The excessive leverage was undisputably an integral part 
of the problem, but while the deleveraging process constitutes an important part 
of the solution, it may take some time before such problems of capital structure 
disappear. The worsening economic conditions and bearish equity markets are 
hardly conducive to an orderly deleveraging process. 
The responses to the crisis have been invariably characterized by the re-
course to extensive relief programs, looser monetary policies and unprecedented 
fiscal stimulus packages, which have their own long-term punitive costs. The 
prospects of severe deterioration of balance sheets for central banks, and wors-
ening levels of indebtedness for governments are not negligible. The reduction 
of the real costs of debt may ultimately take place through higher inﬂation. The 
inception of quantitative easing and purchase of government bonds by the Fed-
eral Reserve are extreme and risky forms of monetary policy, which can be con-
ducive to inﬂationary pressures and currency devaluation. It is thus important 
to shift focus away from solutions based on government debt. It was excessive 
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leverage that fuelled speculative activities and contributed to the observed asset 
bubbles. The important question remains as to whether public debt financing 
can constitute a viable solution to the crisis. Simple remedies based on excessive 
public borrowing may only sow the seeds for future sovereign debt crises. It is 
thus, important to reﬂect upon the issue of whether equity ﬁnancing should take 
precedence over debt ﬁnancing. The U.S. credit crisis provides an opportunity to 
consider the viability of more equitable remedies such as debt for equity swaps, 
which can be more effective and inherently consistent with market discipline 
and responsible investment. Admittedly, the solutions to structural problems are 
hardly palatable, but as argued by Paul Krugman, the only important structural 
impediments are the obsolete doctrines that clutter our minds.
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